The French Have the Quantum Circuits
A researcher has developed a method to make quantum attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems significantly cheaper. Due to concerns about the implications of publishing this information, a compromise was reached to use zero knowledge proofs instead. However, the effectiveness of these proofs in keeping the details secret has already been challenged by subsequent research.
- ▪The researcher found a way to reduce the cost of quantum attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems by ten times.
- ▪A decision was made to publish zero knowledge proofs instead of detailed information to protect against potential attackers.
- ▪Just two months after the publication, a researcher successfully reconstructed similar circuits, demonstrating the challenges of keeping such information secret.
Opening excerpt (first ~120 words) tap to expand
A year ago, I found a way to make quantum attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems ten times cheaper. Specifically, I found a better way to perform elliptic curve point addition on a quantum computer. I bounce between projects, so it can take me months to get around to writing something like this up, but I wanted to eventually publish these improvements. I’ve published similar improvements before, because knowing the cost of attacks is crucial to making informed decisions about defense. However, this time, something new happened: pushback on the wisdom of publishing. The estimated cost of quantum attacks has plummeted over the past decade. It seems possible that cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) could exist within years.
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Excerpt limited to ~120 words for fair-use compliance. The full article is at Algassert.
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